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1. Introduction
There is a broad consensus in society regarding the possibility of a so-called rise from rags
to riches. It is widely thought to be indisputable that certain individual effort almost au-
tomatically leads to social and economic advancement. However, the OECD (2008, p. 204)
states, that ”many OECD countries are rightly concerned about intergenerational mobil-
ity - the extent of transmission of advantages or disadvantages across generations. When
children ’inherit’ a substantial degree of their economic status or other important social
characteristics from their parents, this generates widespread perceptions of unfairness and
lack of opportunity. Societies characterised by a high transmission of social and economic
status from generation to generation are mostly perceived as unfair”. It is therefor of great
interest to find out if the social status of an individual is determined by the economic or
social situation of his/her ancestors, and to what extent that might be the case. If it turns
out that wages are independent between generations and income is not predetermined by
one’s parental economic status, this outcome would support the view of ”equality of op-
portunity”. From a sociological as well as an economic perspective, limited social mobility
implies loss of efficiency, since children from socially disadvantaged families hardly have
access to the market of so-called high potentials even though they might have specialized
skills. Resources would therefore not be deployed adequately, a result which has social
and political consequences.
The present analysis concentrates on the financial sphere of intergenerational transfers,
therefore making the suitable denomination of the object of investigation the intergen-
erational transmission of income rather than social mobility. Our main focus lies on
distributional issues such as the analysis of mobility differences on different parts of the
income distribution.
This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we provide a short literature survey.
Although previous studies emphasize mobility in the United States, we concentrate on
literature based on European countries, since our main focus lies on the European Union.
TThe bulk of articles deals with data problems regarding the investigation of intergenera-
tional mobility as well as nonlinearities in the measurement of intergenerational transmis-
sions of income. This segues into section 3’s discussion of our data, where we describe the
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) as well as issues
concerning sample selection. In Section 4 we elaborate several methods for the analysis of
intergenerational mobility such as income elasticities and quantile regression approaches.
We give particular attention to the critique of these methods in the relevant literature.
Finally we present the main results in section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses some
policy implications.
2. Literature At A Glance
While the current state of research on intergenerational mobility in most European coun-
tries is extremely weak, there has been a plethora of research on an international scale.
Mulligan (1999, p. 187) presents a detailed list of articles concerning intergenerational
mobility across several topics (see Table 1). 16 articles among them deal with earnings
2
or wages and estimate income elasticities1 between 0.11 and 0.59 and an average value
of 0.34. Solon (2002) lists twelve articles concerning intergenerational mobility in coun-
tries other than the United States. He refers to studies in Canada, Finland, Germany,
Malaysia, South Africa, Sweden and the United Kingdom which find mobility measures
between fathers and sons with elasticity values between 0.11 (Germany) and 0.57 (United
Kingdom). Most of these elasticity coefficients are calculated by least square estimates of
a log-linear regression with age controls for both generations.
Table 1: Studies of Intergenerational Mobility
Economic Characteristic Number of Estimates Range Average
1. Years of schooling 8 .14-.45 .29
2. Log earnings or wages 16 .11-.59 .34
3. Log family income 10 .14-.65 .43
4. Log family wealth 9 .27-.76 .50
5. Log family consumption 2 .59-.77 .68
(Source: Mulligan 1999, p. 187)
One in depth study of intergenerational transmission of income comes from the case
of Sweden, where O¨sterberg (2000) analyses tax-data files to examine intergenerational
transmissions of earnings status. O¨sterberg uses data from the Swedish Income Panel,
which consists of a representative one percent sample drawn from the register of the
total population. The information on income was gathered in two different periods, each
lasting three years (1978 to 1980 for the parents and 1990 to 1992 for the children). This
separation leads to varying mean ages for parents (fathers: 52, mothers: 49) and children
(37) at the point of observation. The author concentrates on regression results as well
as on transition matrices with respect to gender and compares his results with the work
of Bjo¨rklund/Ja¨ntti (1997). O¨sterberg reports high intergenerational income mobility in
Sweden compared to estimates from most other countries. He derives correlation values
varying between 0.11 and 0.18, depending on different restrictions. Ja¨ntti et al. (2006)
calculate a correlation of 0.14 for Sweden which is rather similar to O¨sterberg’s results.
Schnitzlein (2008) provides a collection of several studies on intergenerational income
mobility carried out between 1997 and 2006 in Germany. He presents an overview of the
income elasticity between fathers and sons. According to the referred authors, observed
intergenerational mobility is higher in Germany than in the United States. However,
this finding is on the basis of very few studies and the conclusions should therefore not
be taken as incontrovertible. Schnitzlein produces estimates of intergenerational income
elasticity values for Germany between 0.10 and 0.37, which means that a marginal increase
in the logarithmic income of parents by one unit leads to an increase in the descendant’s
logarithmic income of between 0.10 and 0.37 units. These positive regression coefficients
1Most empirical analysis is based on a simple regression equation, denoted by
ln Yi,t = α+ β · ln Yi,s + i,t
where ln Yi,t is the logarithmic life time income of a descendant of family i. This is determined by
the average income of his generation α, a noise term i,t and the influence of the parental logarithmic
income of his parents ln Yi,s. The coefficient β measures the income elasticity between two generations
(see Corak 2004, p. 10).
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may be interpreted as a positive relationship between earnings of fathers and sons, and
hence limited income mobility.
Zimmerman (1992) cites several studies for income elasticity in the United States. These
studies revealed that the elasticity coefficients of children’s earnings with respect to par-
ent’s earnings are between 0.15 and 0.45. Zimmerman himself estimates the elasticity of
descendant’s earnings with respect to parental income to be 0.4. However, Mazumder
(2005) argues that due to persistent transitory fluctuations these estimates have been bi-
ased down by approximately 30% and instead calculates an intergenerational earnings elas-
ticity (IGE) of around 0.6 for the United States. From a vast pool of studies on intergen-
erational income mobility, other relevant literature has been provided by Vogel (2006) and
Scha¨fer/Schmidt (2009) for Germany, Kopczuk/Saez/Song (2010) for the United States,
Atkinson (1981) and Dearden/Machin/Reed (1997) for United Kingdom, Bjo¨rklund/Ja¨ntti
(1997) for Sweden as well as Corak/Heiz (1996) for the case of Canada, and OECD (2010)
and Causa/Dantan/Johansson (2009) for European OECD countries. Extensive work on
North America and Europe has been published in a volume edited by Corak (2004). One
of the most recent surveys on IGEs and their causal mechanisms has been conducted by
Black/Devereux (2010).
Although cross-country comparisons of IGEs may provide a first clue of the main differ-
ences between countries, such comparisons can be misleading – particularly if elasticities
differ across quantiles of the income or earnings distribution. If we focus on the lower part
of the income distribution we are studying the “stickiness” of poverty, whilst in the upper
tail our concern is on the “stickiness” of wealth. Since both transmission mechanisms and
policy conclusions will be entirely different for either tail of the distribution, it is necessary
to analyze overall IGEs specifically by quantiles. In other words, it is imperative to take
care of nonlinearities. A brief literature survey on nonlinearities in the intergenerational
transmission setting is presented in the following section.
2.1. Literature on Nonlinearities
As far as the authors know, the issue of nonlinearities in intergenerational earnings mobility
was raised for the first time by the doyen of distribution theory, Sir Tony Atkinson, nearly
thirty years ago:
”The proportion of upwardly mobile sons from the bottom 20 percent appears
to be considerably higher and the proportion of downwardly mobile sons from
the top 20 percent appears to be lower.”
Atkinson/Maynard/Trinder (1983, p. 114)
Most of the earlier studies which consider the issue of nonlinearity have done so in
order to test the conjecture of Becker/Tomes (1986) which would imply a concave rela-
tionship between the earnings of parents and their descendants. This conjecture has been
verified by some studies (e.g. Eide/Showalter 1999). Several other studies provided evi-
dence for (more) convex patterns (e.g. Corak/Heisz 1999, Bratsberg et al. 2007, Bjo¨rklund/
Ja¨ntti 1997, Bjo¨rklund/Roine/Waldenstro¨m 2010). However, aggregation of the relation-
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ship between the earnings of parents and their children (concave vs. convex vs. linear)
is rather crude, and we have to be cautious — it is only by studying the details of the
functional form of IGE that we can offer more conclusive results.
Studies testing nonlinearity use either ordinary least squares regression (OLS), transition
matrices, instrumental variables (IV) or quantile regression techniques. Most of these
studies have been carried out for the U.S. and U.K. Later on, studies for Canada, Australia
and the Scandinavian countries have been done. Many of these studies have demonstrated
particular asymmetries for the bottom and top fractiles of parent’s earnings: upward
mobility from the bottom is more likely than downward mobility from the top. However,
these asymmetries differ quite a lot between countries.
In his seminal paper on intergenerational mobility for the U.S., Solon (1992) focuses
explicitly on nonlinearity. He tries to capture nonlinearity by adding the square of father’s
log earnings. However, even if he provides some evidence for nonlinearity, the study’s small
sample size (just 348 father-son pairs) limits the ability to give evidence for statistical
significance.
Corak/Heisz (1999) provide a significant empirical analysis with a very large data sample
from Canada. They analyze IGEs with a data sample drawn from tax records of 400,000
father-son pairs. They provide evidence for high mobility in the middle of the distribution
and low mobility in the tails. Importantly, they also present conclusive evidence that
earnings mobility is far greater than income mobility. For the top-income group IGEs
were 0.4 and 0.8 for earnings and income, respectively. Large differences in IGEs by
earnings and income is also substantiated by Bjo¨rklund/Roine/Waldenstro¨m (2010).
Mazumder (2005) offers a very accurate study on the impact of wealth on IGE. First,
he shows convincingly that by using variables which give a better indication of life-long
income, the IGE for the U.S. increases from former estimates of 0.4 (Solon 1992, Zim-
merman 1992) up to 0.6. Furthermore, he splits his data samples into two and four
respectively equally large sub-groups and estimates IGEs for each sub-sample. He finds
strong evidence that the richer half of his sample is more mobile than those below median
wealth. Although he is rather cautious with the interpretation of his results, he concludes
that an obvious candidate for policymakers could be promotion of greater educational
attainment among poorer households. However, to specify the functional form of IGEs
we have to analyze IGEs at smaller sub-samples than halves or quarters. For that reason,
very large data samples are absolutely vital to these studies.
A different approach is performed by Grawe (2004). He uses Canadian tax data with
56,141 father-son pairs. Grawe introduces a new theoretical interpretation of nonlineari-
ties: he argues that the existence of credit constraints is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for nonlinearities in intergenerational mobility as long as IGEs depend, inter alia,
on the nature of the earnings function. If this is the case, international comparisons of
intergenerational earnings mobility might be more complex. In particular, the nature of
the functional form in the relationship of an IGE is likely to vary across countries with the
nature of earnings relationships as well as with differences in factors relating to financial
markets, human capital acquisition and public policy. However, testing such hypotheses
might be troublesome Black/Devereux (2010).
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Ja¨ntti et al. (2006) also use transition matrices to estimate mobility by quintiles for the
U.K., U.S., Denmark, Norway and Finland. They find that persistence is most pronounced
in the tails of the distribution whilst mobility between the middle three quintiles is fairly
similar across all five countries. Persistence in the top is strong in all five countries.
However, mobility from the lowest quintile is found to be much higher in Norway and
Denmark. Interestingly, they find that the much larger IGE in the U.S. and U.K. compared
to the Nordic countries is almost entirely due to differences in the tails. In particular, the
U.S. and U.K. exhibit a lower top-down mobility than the Nordic countries. Additionally,
and in contrast to the Nordic countries, the U.S. exhibits strong persistence at the bottom
of the income distribution. Due to these peculiarities of the U.S. they call this result
“American exceptionalism”.
Another seminal contribution to the discussion of the importance of nonlinearity in IGEs
is Bratsberg et al. (2007). They use a dataset with more than 280,000 observations to test
for nonlinearities and compare the U.S., U.K., Denmark, Finland and Norway. Their
results provide evidence that the IGE is close to linear for father’s income in the U.S. and
U.K. while the pattern is convex in the three Nordic countries. Also there results testify
strong intergenerational persistence at the top of the income distribution for Denmark,
Finland and Norway. They argue that this is due to the educational systems in Nordic
countries, which ensure equal educational standards for all citizens.
Looking at the U.S., Kopczuk/Saez/Song (2010) explore not only short-term fluctua-
tions but also the evolution of mobility and inequality over a lifetime. They show quite
convincingly that mobility at the top of the earnings distribution has been very stable
since 1978; the probability of staying in the top one percentile remains between 65% and
80%. Even the surge in top earnings since 1985 has not been accomplished by increased
mobility at the top. Mobility on the lower side of the income distribution is different.
The relatively stable mobility of total population for the bottom two quintiles (P0 – P40)
over the period 1950-1980 hides strong heterogeneity by gender groups: while men show
slightly declining long-term mobility, women display strong upward-mobility mainly due
to their strong economic progress. Hertz (2005) provides a convincing graphical illustra-
tion of different mobilities among diverse income groups. Although the intergenerational
correlation of incomes in his data set for the U.S. is only 0.42, the differences in the likely
life trajectories of the children of the poor and the rich are substantial. In particular those
at the tails, i.e. those stuck in either poverty or affluence, do exhibit much stronger persis-
tence. For example, a child born to the top decile has a 43.3 percent chance of attaining
the top quintile. In contrast, the child of the poorest decile has a 4.3 percent chance of
attaining the top quintile. The immobility on the lower tail is even larger. Children of
the poorest decile have a 51.3 percent chance of occupying the lowest quintile, while those
from the richest decile have only a 3.5 percent chance of ending up there. Additionally,
mobility patterns differ dramatically by race. In particular, persistence in the bottom
decile is much higher for blacks than for whites. In a similar vein Bowles/Gintis (2002)
argue that the main explanation for strong persistence at the top is related to the fact
that children of well-off parents obtain more and higher quality schooling. Additionally,
wealth inheritance makes an important contribution for the persistence at the top. Since
low wealth and low educational attainment is strongly correlated with blacks this is not
surprising.
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Rather recently, Bjo¨rklund/Roine/Waldenstro¨m (2010) presented an investigation on
IGEs for the top of the distribution for Sweden. They analyze a data sample with 100,000
father-sons pairs and find that it is crucial to study small fractions in the top of the
distribution to get a clear picture of income mobility. They find that Sweden, although
a country which is known for having relatively high intergenerational mobility in general,
is a society where intergenerational transmission remains strong in the very top of the
distribution. Similar to Bowles/Gintis (2002) they find that wealth is the most likely
channel for such strong persistence.
Recently, the first studies on intergenerational mobility with EU-SILC data were con-
ducted (Esping-Andersen/Wagner 2010, Causa/Dantan/Johansson 2009). As explained
below in more detail, these are standardized data for the 27 countries in the EU. Esping-
Andersen/Wagner (2010) focus on five countries – Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain and
France – and find substantially greater mobility in Scandinavia. They say that this dif-
ference is primarily due to a ‘bottom-up’ process of equalization; as they show, the ad-
vantages associated with coming from highly advantaged origins are quite persistent. Like
Bjo¨rklund/Roine/Waldenstro¨m (2010) they conclude that the advantages related to priv-
ileged origins persist also in the two Nordic countries. Causa/Dantan/Johansson (2009)
provide comparable estimates of intergenerational wage and education persistence across
14 European OECD countries. Their data also suggest that persistence is higher in the
tails and in particular at the top. However, they measure persistence in wages in relation
to father’s education and not with respect to father’s earnings, as we do. They suggest
that financial constraints might hinder disadvantaged parents from investing in high ability
children’s education.
To conclude, although there are quite a few international studies on nonlinearities,
empirical research with standardized data for the EU is rare. At least to our knowledge
with the exception of the two mentioned studies by Causa/Dantan/Johansson (2009) and
Esping-Andersen/Wagner (2010) no cross-country comparison on nonlinearities for the
EU exists. We want to fill this gap with the present study.
3. Data
3.1. Data specification
There are several challenging issues concerning the measurement of intergenerational mo-
bility. The most evident problem is the lack of appropriate data, since most countries
do not have data on income for two related generations. Even if some information on
income for multiple regions is available, there could be severe inconveniences comparing
observations across countries. To our knowledge, there is only scarce data to analyze the
intergenerational transmission of income in the European Union and none available for a
precise comparison across regions. Bjo¨rklund/Ja¨ntti (1997), for instance, had to estimate
intergenerational income correlations for independent fathers and sons, because income
data for related generations were not available for Sweden. Their technique was based on
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predictions of progenitors’ earnings given their education and occupational status2. The
same procedure is applied by Andrews/Leigh (2009) due to the lack of data. The authors
approximate hourly wages by a regression on a vector of dummies for occupation and age.
The earnings of fathers in a certain occupation is then predicted to be the same as those
of a 40 year old man in this profession. In his article on Germany, Schnitzlein (2008)
points out, that there are no existing data that contain long term (or at best life time)
earnings for two interconnected generations. For this reason, economists find a remedy in
approximations via annual observation time series3.
For most European countries no Census data on monetary income for two related gen-
erations is available. Consequently, the only practicable method to investigate intergener-
ational income mobility is the usage of survey data that include questions concerning the
financial situation of a respondent’s ancestors. The European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) provides such data in its 2005 questionnaire and again
in the 2011 panel wave. The EU-SILC is a survey carried out in private households with a
central focus on income, employment, living, health and financial conditions. The sample
population is made up of households with at least one household member aged 16 or older.
The EU-SILC questionnaire replaced the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).
Since the last panel wave of the ECHP in 2001, no data on income and living conditions
were collected on a European scale4. The EU-SILC project was started in 2003 to pursue
the objective of a standardized survey for comparable analysis of economic conditions in
European households.
As far as the income level of parents in the EU-SILC 2005 is concerned, a relevant
question asks whether there were financial problems in the respondent’s household when
he/she was aged 12 to 16 years old. Responses were classified into five levels between most
of the time to never. In some countries (e.g. Austria) the equivalent question asks how
the respondent would characterize the financial situation of the household from age 12 to
16 (5 response categories from very good to very bad). Consequently, our approximation
for wealth and income status of parents will come from the five categorical responses to
these questions, where a value of one means very bad financial conditions and five means
very good income status.
However, retrospective questioning of descendants is often not accurate in determining
parental income, since the reference date in questionnaires varies widely for different age
groups. In general, estimations of the former income of parents that date back a long
time are less valid than recent time periods5. As a consequence, the estimations of elder
participants in such surveys may be less solid than those of younger respondents6. For
instance, Figure 1 shows for the case of Austria, respondents over 45 years of age tend
to declare their parental household poor (26.3% compared to 14.4%) or very poor (6.9%
to 3.8%) more often than younger interviewees, whereas the median category in both
group is most often picked. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between age and
the parental financial status is −0.234 (p = 0.00) and indicates a negative relationship
2O¨sterberg (2000, p. 422)
3Problems and potential biases are discussed by Becker/Tomes (1986) and Zimmerman (1992).
4Statistik Austria (2007b, p. 5)
5cp. Statistik Austria (2007a, p. 59-60)
6Couch/Dunn (1997, p. 220) show that downward biases may be reduced by raising the cutoff age to 25,
resulting in higher correlation coefficients.
8
between age and parental income.
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Figure 1: Parental Income for Age Groups in Austria
Aside from the main problem of the retrospective questioning, there is another problem
that comes up in survey data with respect to the income of respondents. Contrary to
official data from tax or social insurance authorities, information on income in question-
naires cannot be verified. Statisticians have to assume that respondents declare their real
incomes, which could lead to substantial biases if the assumption is violated. Especially
at the ends of the income distribution, there could be a tendency to over- or understate
one’s income. However, although these measurement problems are quite critical, they are
less of a concern for cross-country comparisons, because there is no reason to suspect that
the biases would be systematically different by country.
Unfortunately not all countries participating in the EU-SILC offer data on the parental
income status, since this question was not obligatory according to the SILC regulations.
We are therefore able to include 20 European Union countries - Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United
Kingdom as well as Iceland and Norway as non-members - into our calculations. Due to
the lack of data for Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Malta, Latvia, Portugal and Romania
these European Union members could not be included into the analysis.
3.2. The EU-SILC 2005 income data
There are several variables regarding an individual’s income collected in the EU-SILC
20057. The reference period for the declaration of all income components was the calendar
7For a detailed list see European Parliament (2003, p. 3).
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year 2004, and all income data was collected on an annual or on a monthly basis. If
respondents could not or were not willing to reveal their exact income, they were asked to
point to a certain level on an income range chart8. However, several values were missing
in the raw data. Missing net income values were imputed in EU-SILC and missing gross
income values were computed using net-gross-conversion.
(a) Gender (b) Age
Figure 2: Mean Wage with Respect to Parental Income Class in Austria for Gender
and Age
The dependent variable in this analysis is the gross hourly wages of employed indi-
viduals9. Most respondents declare their work time per week, allowing us to calculate
the annualized wages on a weekly and an hourly basis. These calculations are based on
wages and salaries paid in cash for time worked in main and any secondary job including
holiday pay and any additional payments during the year preceding the interview. For
those observations for which monthly wages in 2005 were available, we updated the 2004
data to reflect the 2005 figures. Finally, we derived the logarithmic hourly wages. While
other studies (e.g. O¨sterberg 2000) lack data for working time, the EU-SILC is equipped
with data on working hours per week, and we are therefore able to correct for potential
working time biases. By way of example, Figure 2 presents the (gross) mean hourly wages
for Austria for all observations by gender as well as by age, given the particular parental
income status from very poor (1) to very good (5). The mean wage is clearly increasing
with the financial situation of the parental household. This is true over both age and
gender. Remarkably, the income gaps between male and female as well as young and old
respondents at both tails of the distribution vary significantly.
8The gross monthly income was categorized into 15 classes ranging from ”1-600” to ”8,001 and more”
euros. For instance, 47 percent seized the possibility to declare their income out of investments (divi-
dends, savings book, building loan contract, stocks and bonds, etc.) by the classification in categories.
The alternative to such charts would be probably increase the rate of non-responses, resulting in a loss
of important information on income
9Note: ”This may potentially exaggerate the degree of intergenerational wage mobility, to the extent that
the offspring of higher-educated families are less likely to be inactive than the offspring of low-educated
families.” (Causa/Dantan/Johansson 2009, p. 10)
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4. The Measurement of Intergenerational Transmission of Income
In this article we will focus on two methodological approaches to analyze intergenerational
mobility. In Section 4.1 we briefly address to simple correlation statistics and in Sections
4.2 and 4.3 we will focus on an econometric approach. All of these measures are used in
the relevant literature and are discussed widely10.
4.1. Spearman Correlation Coefficient
Since parental income in the EU-SILC 2005 is not provided as a floating variable but
rather as a ranked proxy, the common Pearson correlation coefficient is not capable of
measuring the relationship between parental and descendant incomes. Instead we use the
Spearman rank correlation coefficient, better known as Spearman’s Rho. The correlation
coefficient is given by
ρ =
∑
i(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√∑
i(xi − x¯)2
∑
i(yi − y¯)2
,
where xi and yi are the ranks. In our case, we are going to calculate the Spearman’s Rho for
the relationship between individuals’ earnings and parental income status. One particular
problem that arises with this approach is the loss of control for age. The correlation
coefficient is only able to capture the direct relationship between the two variables, but
can’t take into account that wages could rise with the age of an individual. This issue will
be handled with least squares regressions
4.2. Model Specification
The common approach to intergenerational income transitions is the calculation of the
regression coefficient β1 of the corresponding parental income to the income of descendants.
Hence, the basic model yields
ln Yi,t = α+ β1 · ln Yi,s + i,t (1)
where Yi,t is the logarithmic income of a descendant, Yi,s is the wage of the parents and
i is a white-noise error term. The coefficient β1 may be denoted as the intergenerational
income elasticity11. Perfect mobility would be attained with a coefficient value of zero,
whereas a value of one would report perfect immobility12. Values close to unity are
indicative of limited mobility.
10See Fields/Ok 1996, Zimmerman 1992
11See Zimmerman (1992), Vogel (2006), Bjo¨rklund/Ja¨ntti (2009), Schnitzlein (2008), etc.
12An important constraint of this approach is given by Anderson/Leo (2009). The authors refer to the
implicit assumption that y and x are homogeneously linear across all socioeconomic strata. If they were
not, one could incorrectly interpret zero correlation as perfect mobility: ”Imagine a deterministic world
(perfectly immobile) where below a certain parental income there is an exact negative relationship
between parent and child outcomes, whereas above that income there is an exact positive relationship
between parent and child outcomes; an appropriately balanced sample would yield 0 correlation with
an inferred perfect mobility for what is a completely deterministic and immobile state.” (Anderson/
Leo 2009, p. 621)
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The basic equation used in this paper denotes
lnY = β0 + β1X + β2P +  (2)
where X is a set of Mincerian13 offspring characteristics affecting wages. Due to the
fact that lifetime earnings may not be derived with the data at hand, the most important
control variable in the matrix is the age of an individual14. Furthermore X contains
dummies for gender, marital status, a managerial position, the company size (more than
50 employees), immigration and a graduation at university. P in Equation (2) counts for
several observed parental characteristics, like education, skill levels or lone parenthood.
In the extended version of Equation (2), dummies for the particular parental income
status are added as parental income dummies (PID).
PIDi =
{
1, if parental income status is i
0, otherwise,
where i is one of the five income classes between very good and very bad (or 1 to 5
respectively). Finally we derive our extended regression Equation (3) consisting of the
individual endowment matrix X, parental characteristics matrix P and the parental in-
come dummies PID2 to PID5 (where PID1 is the nummeraire). The coefficients β3 to
β6 indicate a change in the logarithmic hourly wages, given a certain parental income
status compared to the initial situation of a very bad financial situation. The interpreta-
tion therefore is always in relation to the worst financial situation and consequently the
coefficients are expected to be above zero.
lnY = β0 + β1X + β2P + β3PID2 + β4PID3 + β5PID4 + β6PID5 +  (3)
As has been shown already in Section 2.1., many studies on intergenerational transmis-
sion of income report evidence of lower mobility at the tails of the earnings distribution.
It is obvious that class rigidities increase the inheritance of poverty across generations. To
obtain a more detailed picture of intergenerational mobility, we control whether income
elasticity differs with a movement along the income distribution path. An appropriate way
is to derive quantile regressions at different percentiles of the distribution15. The elasticity
values at arbitrary percentiles θ can be derived by
min
β∈Rk
 ∑
i∈{i:Yi,t≥xi,tβ}
θ|Yi,t −Xi,tβ|+
∑
i∈{i:Yi,t<xi,tβ}
(1− θ)|Yi,t −Xi,tβ|
 (4)
13See Causa/Dantan/Johansson (2009, p. 8)
14See Solon (1992, p. 399)
15For a detailed introduction into quantile regressions see Koenker/Hallock (2001); for its application see
Koenker (2010)
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where Yi,t is the dependent variable, Xi,t is the vector of explaining characteristics
and β is the vector of estimated coefficients. Using the methodic framework of quan-
tile regressions we should be able to reveal non-linear characteristics of intergenerational
transmissions of income.
4.3. Critical Remarks on OLS methods
A cautious approach to OLS coefficients of income variables is recommended by Zimmer-
man (1992). According to him, there are potential life-cycle biases caused by the arbitrary
date of observation of the sample. The most decisive problem is the particular time of
the data acquisition16. It is not possible to reveal whether a descendant, aged 20, draws a
lower salary due to a low life-span income or due to the recent career entry. If the latter
is true, the person could certainly be in another position in the income distribution if
asked 15 years later. Ideally, income data would be available over the entire working lives
of parents and descendants respectively. Beyond these distortions, short-term proxies for
lifetime economic status, such as annual earnings could be influenced by transitory fluc-
tuations. This measurement error could lead to a higher variance of the observed value
than that of the underlying life-cycle value and consequently result in downward-biased
OLS-coefficients (see Mazumder 2005).
Another caution is given by Corak (2004, p. 11), who points out that there is a differ-
ence between income elasticity and income advantage when the earnings distribution for
the parental generation is unequal. He argues that even small elasticity coefficients may
indicate substantial income advantages for children, depending on the degree of inequality
in the parental earnings distribution. Bjo¨rklund/Ja¨ntti (2009, p. 497) discuss this issue as
well. They argue that the OLS-coefficient depends on income dispersion in two genera-
tions. Thus, if income inequality rises from one generation to another, a larger coefficient
will be needed to account for the increased income variation in the second generation.
Consequently, an elasticity coefficient multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviations
of parental and descendant income should be preferred, namely ϕ = β(σf/σs). This cor-
relation coefficient provides information how many standard deviations the child’s wage
would change with a modification in the standard deviation of the parental income.
O’Neill/Sweetman/Van de Gaer (2007, p. 160) focus on measurement errors in least
squares estimations: ”Omitted variable bias [...] occurs when unobserved characteristics
that are inherited from parents, such as ability, are also correlated with earnings. The
OLS estimator mistakenly attributes the variation in earnings due to inherited endowments
directly to parental earnings, leading us to overestimate the causal effect of parental earn-
ings on children’s earnings. While the simple linear regression model provides a useful
summary of the conditional mean function, it is only a partial description of the joint dis-
tribution of earnings. When considering intergenerational mobility patterns throughout
the distribution, researchers have traditionally moved away from regression based models
and relied instead upon transition matrices.”
According to this critique as well as to the problems of on nonlinearities which were
16Schnitzlein (2008, p. 12), Zimmerman (1992, p. 411)
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discussed in Section 2.1, we proceed as follows: First, we perform simple correlation
statistics for offspring and parental income for all 22 countries under consideration and
discuss the preliminary findings. We then estimate several OLS equations with variables
for the individual, the employer, and the parental situation as along with interaction terms.
Additionally, we add dummies for the financial situation of the respondent’s parents. Since
we find significant effects for these dummies, we perform quantile regressions in which
quantiles of the conditional distribution of actual incomes are expressed as functions of
parental incomes.
5. Main Findings
5.1. Correlation Statistics
In Figure 3 the Spearman rank correlation coefficients for actual (logarithmic) income of
descendants and the parental income status are illustrated. All values are significant at a
5%-level except the one for Denmark, which shows the lowest correlation. The Northern
European states display the smallest relationship between the parental and the offspring’s
earnings. The data reveals that Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland
and Norway exhibit lower correlation than Central European countries like Italy, Austria,
Spain or in the extreme case of Luxembourg. For comparison,we refer to the OECD (2010,
p. 185) study, which sums up various studies on intergenerational income mobility and
shows strong links between individual and parental earnings in United Kingdom, Italy,
USA, France, Spain and Germany. Weak relationship is seen in Denmark, Australia,
Norway, Finland and Canada. We may support these results for the covered countries
with the remark, that mobility in Spain is noticeable lower than in Italy or France in our
calculations.
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Figure 3: Spearman Correlation Coefficients between Actual and Parental Income
Fessler/Schu¨rz/Mooslechner (2011) pointed out, that the level of educational mobility
in Austria is similar to Italy or Slovenia and substantially lower than in the Netherlands,
Finland or Sweden. As can be seen in Figure 3 this is accurate for the intergenerational
transmission of income status as well. While Finland (0.044), the Netherlands (0.053) and
Sweden (0.053) belong to the highly mobile class, Austria (0.131) may be associated with
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Italy (0.133), Belgium (0.127) and Slovenia (0.121). The OECD (2010, p. 187) mentions
education as a key driver of intergenerational persistence in wages. According to the
authors, the influence of parental educational attainments on their descendant’s wages
could reflect social norms or work ethics transmitted to children but also the role of
social networks. In Figure 4, we examine the relationship between the educational level
of parents17 and the descendant’s income.
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Figure 4: Spearman Correlation of Parental Education and Offspring Income
The relationship between the parental educational level and the offspring income in
Scandinavian or Northern countries is significantly lower than in other European countries.
Once more, Luxembourg shows the highest correlation between characteristics of parents
and the income of descendants. Obviously well-educated parents have higher probabilities
to have children in well-paid jobs with higher educational attainments. In Scandinavian
countries children seem to be more independent with respect to parental income status
and educational level. The implementation of ordinary least squares estimations should
reveal the relationship in a more detailed way, especially as far as we may control for the
matter of age.
5.2. Regression results
The OLS model in use was described in section 4.2 which we firstly adapt for Austria. As a
first step we want detect whether there are problems of multi-collinearity within a ordinary
least squares model. There are reasonable arguments that several variables (such as the
educational level of descendants) could correlate with the parental income status. We
could not find any severe effects of multi-collinearity by calculating the variance inflation
factor (VIF). A VIF near 1 implies no multi-collinearity while a value of 5 or higher reports
some problems with the variables. The mean VIF in our model equals to 2.03 which signals
low risk of multi-collinearity18.
Further, a simple F-Test reveals if at least one parental income indicator (PID) shows
significant influence on the offspring’s income. Our null hypothesis H0 : β2 = β3 =
17The educational level of parents in these calculations is calculated by taking the highest educational
attainment of the household, whether it is that of the mother or the father.
18Additional pairwise correlation analysis did not reveal significant multicollinearity effects.
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β4 = β5 = 0 resulting from our model specified in Equation (3) may be rejected on all
reasonable levels, indicating a significant influence of at least one indicator variable in
the model. We therefore prefer the inclusion of the parental income indicators (See Table
A.2). For comparison, we also show results for the simplified model. However, the basic
model seems to be the best choice.
The estimation output for the basic model shows highly significant coefficients for nearly
all explanatory variables. While gender and immigration have a negative impact on earn-
ings, a leading position in one’s company and the possession of a university degree have
strong positive effects on income. Among the PIDs, the first is insignificant, whilst PID3
is significant at the 10%-level and PID4 and PID5 are significant on a 1%-level. There is
a significant income difference between descendants who declare their childhood household
either very poor or poor. However, offspring with good or very good financial background
earn significantly more than their very poor peers. This is a strong indicator that parental
income does have an influence and intergenerational mobility is limited.
Table 2: Income Effects on Parent Status Movement
1→ 2 1→ 3 1→ 4 1→ 5
LU .2054∗∗∗ .2639∗∗∗ .3295∗∗∗ .3633∗∗∗
CY .0743∗ .15∗∗∗ .1753∗∗∗ .2185∗∗∗
CZ .0743∗∗ .1138∗∗∗ .1681∗∗∗ .1866∗∗∗
AT .0451 .0598∗ .1429∗∗∗ .1444∗∗∗
IT .0477∗∗∗ .1096∗∗∗ .1235∗∗∗ .1386∗∗∗
ES .0065 .0644∗∗∗ .0682∗∗∗ .1248∗∗∗
IS .2398 .1598 .1211 .1236
PL .0412 .0889∗∗∗ .0659∗∗∗ .1141∗∗∗
BE .0359 .094∗∗∗ .0736∗∗ .1113∗∗∗
UK -.0492 .0992∗ .0322 .109∗∗
SK .0385 .0334 .054 .0976∗∗
NO .1753 .0627 .0868 .0915
NL .1099∗ .0725 .0465 .085∗
SI .0263 .0528 .0017 .082
LT .0107 .0221 .0466 .073∗∗
SE .0121 -.005 .0044 .0545
FR -.0284 .0399 .0458∗ .0516∗∗
IE -.062 .007 .0598 .0511
EE .0013 .0706∗ .075∗2 .0448
HU -.0046 .0121 .0218 .0441
DK -.0533 -.0254 -.0121 -.0528
FI .0832 -.0442 -.0465 -.0836
Since we are particularly interested in an international comparison of the influence of the
different PIDs at an international comparison19, we present the results for all 22 countries
together in Table 2. The table shows the income effects of a movement in the parental
19We can calculate the influence of the various ranks in the parental distribution to descendants’ earnings
as a percent, since the response variable is logarithmic. Omitting the parental variable and simply
regressing β0 + β1X would yield an income of eβ0+β1X . Introducing the first of the dummy variables
would lead to an income of eβ0+β1X+β2 . β0 captures the effects where the financial situation of the
parental household was very poor, but we are also interested in the same effect on a child from a
better-off parental household. The percentaged difference can be shown to be
eβ0+β1X+β2 − eβ0+β1X
eβ0+β1X
= e
β0+β1X · eβ2 − eβ0+β1X
eβ0+β1X
= eβ2 − 1
Consequently, the percentage influence of all dummies compared to the original Equation (2) can be
16
income situation based on the initial situation to be very poor. The last column shows the
increase of wages if parents are very rich as opposed to being at the lowest income level.
The income effect of a parental income status movement from the lowest to the highest
class on the descendant’s earnings is seen as the best indicator of how mobile a wage
structure is. A value of zero would mean that one’s family background has no influence
on income. In contrast, high values indicate low intergenerational mobility. As far as
Nordic countries like Sweden, Norway, Denmark or Finland are concerned, the regression
coefficients are entirely meaningless. Not a single one is significant on standard levels,
which implies that a link between parental and offspring income cannot be verified. Austria
is ranked behind Luxembourg, Cyprus and Czech Republic as one of the least mobile
countries, followed by Italy, Poland and Spain.
Table 3: Quantile Regression Coefficients for Selected Countries
Austria 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
bad -0.009 -0.027 -0.003 0.064 0.114∗∗
fair 0.001 0.015 0.014 0.040∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
good 0.029 0.087∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
very good 0.028 0.063 0.102∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
Finland 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
bad 0.172 0.064 0.042 0.026 0.026
fair 0.008 0.027 0.026 0.032 0.032
good -0.017 0.018 0.029 0.033 0.024
very good -0.100 0.011 0.024 0.009 0.019
Italy 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
bad 0.075∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.009
fair 0.125∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
good 0.132∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
very good 0.165∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
Spain 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
bad −0.056∗ 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.021
fair 0.031 0.037∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗
good 0.060∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗
very good 0.075∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
Sweden 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
bad 0.009 -0.025 0.004 -0.012 0.088
fair -0.069 0.050 0.047 0.024 0.103
good 0.012 0.064 0.047∗∗ -0.010 0.105
very good -0.001 0.063 0.058∗∗ 0.030 0.144∗∗
We now turn towards non-linear effects of intergenerational transmissions of income. We
therefore apply quantile regression methods on our ordinary least squares estimation to
reveal the effects of parental income status at particular positions in the income distribu-
tion. The results for the estimates of conditional quantile functions for selected countries
are presented in Table 3. All variables from the basic model presented in Table A.2 were
measured by
eβi − 1 ∀ i ∈ {2, · · · , 5}
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included into our calculations. However, in Table 3 we concentrate on the effects of the
parental income class. We see here that interesting patterns emerge. Austria and Spain
show stronger intergenerational transmission of income at the top quantiles; mobility in
Italy is strictly limited at both tails of the distribution and Northern countries like Fin-
land and Sweden display insignificant coefficients across all quantiles. Hence, in Austria
and Spain, a higher income distribution quantile implies a stronger relationship between
parental and offspring income. The significance levels show a convincing correlation of in-
come between generations, especially for wealthier respondents, whereas in lower income
groups some parental income values are insignificant. The results reveal higher intergen-
erational transmission of income in upper income classes. For the case of Italy, we find
significant intergenerational income elasticities at all points in the distribution. Again,
we cannot detect severe influence of parental income on descendants’ wages in Northern
European countries.
Another way to illustrate the income specific intergenerational mobility is shown in
Figure 5 for the case of Austria and Sweden. The graphs show the quantile regression
coefficients for a shift from the lowest to the highest parental income class. In Austria
there is a steep incline of the curve, indicating a higher transmission of parental income
in the upper tail of the offspring earnings distribution. Sweden shows a noticeably flatter
progression, which signifies equal effects of parental income transmissions over the entire
earnings distribution20.
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Figure 5: Quantile Regression Results for Austria and Sweden
5.3. Intergenerational Mobility and Inequality
Finally, we want to look on the relationship between inequality and mobility for the full
sample of countries. Andrews/Leigh (2009) investigate the relationship between inequality
and intergenerational mobility. By proxying father’s earnings via occupational data, they
reveal that sons who grew up in countries that were more unequal in the 1970s were less
20Figure A.1 in the Appendix provides similar graphs for all included countries.
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likely to have experienced social mobility by the late 1990s. Recent research by the OECD
(2010, p. 193) confirms that higher inequality is associated with lower intergenerational
mobility. According to the authors a higher income dispersion could lead to higher returns
to education and individuals whose investments to education are not limited by family
background may benefit in particular. Comparing the results in Figure 6 with the figures
in Andrews/Leigh (2009) and OECD (2010), the previous findings may be supported.
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Figure 6: Gini Coefficients and Intergenerational Income Correlation
In these figures a simple regression between the intergenerational correlation coefficient
(discussed in Section 5.1) and the Gini Index21 of the respective country is performed. In
the full sample we derive a β-coefficient of 0.523 (t = 2.45) and a coefficient of determina-
tion R2 = 0.23. In a second step we concentrate on the old European Union members and
exclude the outlier Luxembourg as well. Now our model is able to increase the coefficient
of determination to R2 = 0.66 with a β-coefficient of 0.887 (t = 4.51). Consequently, for
the countries being analyzed, the hypothesis of Andrews/Leigh (2009) and OECD (2010)
can be confirmed.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have examined several indicators for intergenerational income (im)mobility of which
no single study can provide a comprehensive picture. However, there are some cross-
country patterns that are remarkable. In all calculations the Nordic countries (Denmark,
Sweden, Norway and Finland) show substantially higher intergenerational mobility than
the remaining EU-25 members under consideration. Luxembourg shows a particularly
immobile social structure. Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain perform
worse than the European average. An OECD (2010) article shows that Southern Euro-
pean countries along with Luxembourg appear to be relatively immobile whereas Nordic
countries tend to be more mobile. In this respect our results are rather similar to those
of the OECD (2010).
21Source: Human Development Report 2006 (http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/)
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The results of a quantile regression show that intergenerational transmission of income is
higher and more significant in the Southern European countries. Austria and Spain show
restricted social mobility, particularly in upper income classes, whereas parental income
seems to be mainly meaningless for the wages of descendants in Nordic countries. Hence,
in Southern European countries rich families tend to stay rich. Moreover we state that
inequality and immobility are linked together. The higher the inequality in a country, the
lower themobility and as a consequence, the lower the chances for social advancement.
Therefore, policies for higher social mobility should be accompanied by policies for more
equal societies. According to the OECD (2010, p. 194), progressive tax systems and social
transfer programs should not only help to make a society more equal but also strengthen
the chances for individual social and economic advancement.
Individual positioning in social systems seems to result by a large extent from origin and
educational status from the very beginning. In its 2006 report on ”Efficiency and Equity
in European education and training systems” the EU Commission states the following:
”Pre-primary education has the highest returns in terms of the social adaptation of
children. Member States should invest more in pre-primary education as an effective means
to establish the basis for further learning, preventing school drop-out, increasing equity of
outcomes and overall skill levels.”
Consequently, it is not only tax policies or social welfare systems that may account for
intergenerational mobility, but basic modifications to the general educational system also
seem to be decisive for more equality of opportunity. Apparently, Scandinavian countries
could serve as a model worth studying for the rest of Europe also in this respect.
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A. Appendix
Table A.1: Mean Hourly Wages by Age Groups
Male Female Observations
< 35 35-44 > 44 < 35 35-44 > 44 Male Female Total
AT 13.16 14.77 16.49 11.56 12.26 13.93 2,185 1,039 3,224
BE 14.56 16.46 19.30 14.34 16.15 18.11 1,907 1,040 2,947
CY 8.43 10.27 12.12 7.51 8.14 9.19 1,790 1,331 3,121
CZ 3.00 3.66 3.21 2.50 2.47 2.59 1,726 1,407 3,133
DK 19.20 23.18 22.92 17.60 19.76 20.12 1,495 1,149 2,644
EE 3.02 3.13 2.59 2.20 2.16 2.04 1,712 1,743 3,455
ES 7.97 10.02 10.99 7.53 9.44 9.87 5,043 2,906 7,949
FI 13.82 16.06 17.08 12.11 13.47 13.60 1,956 1,675 3,631
FR 11.87 14.40 16.20 11.37 12.88 13.66 3,325 2,239 5,564
HU 2.61 2.63 3.14 2.30 2.38 2.62 2,374 2,092 4,466
IE 17.77 22.01 23.60 17.82 21.40 21.70 1,060 876 1,936
IS 16.95 19.02 19.76 12.99 16.88 15.57 719 502 1,221
IT 10.39 12.28 14.65 9.82 11.65 13.33 7,445 4,634 12,079
LT 2.29 2.07 2.34 1.82 1.93 2.10 1,541 1,662 3,203
LU 16.79 22.44 29.47 17.11 19.22 24.96 1,857 874 2,731
NL 16.29 20.74 23.87 16.44 18.33 19.91 1,873 468 2,341
NO 19.52 22.62 22.75 16.24 17.49 18.76 1,472 961 2,433
PL 2.24 2.58 2.68 2.23 2.55 2.64 5,034 4,448 9,482
SE 13.47 16.32 17.22 11.54 13.01 14.18 1,253 795 2,048
SI 5.65 6.63 7.32 5.50 6.86 7.28 1,709 1,526 3,235
SK 2.25 2.42 2.29 1.77 1.82 1.93 2,403 2,339 4,742
UK 18.10 20.81 21.00 16.32 17.63 14.85 1,237 984 2,221
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Table A.2: Estimation Output for Austria
Standard Model Reduced Model Basic Model
Age 0.0129∗ (0.007) 0.0065∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.0075∗∗∗ (0.001)
Age squared -0.0001 (0.000)
Female -0.1589∗∗∗ (0.021) -0.1487∗∗∗ (0.016) -0.1524∗∗∗ (0.016)
Married 0.0484∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.0468∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.0474∗∗∗ (0.017)
Immigrant -0.1064∗∗∗ (0.032) -0.1510∗∗∗ (0.026) -0.1444∗∗∗ (0.026)
Female × Immigrant -0.0709 (0.056)
Managerial Position 0.1231∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.1262∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.1252∗∗∗ (0.010)
Female × Managerial Position 0.0089 (0.021)
Firm Size > 50 0.0636∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.0635∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.0622∗∗∗ (0.016)
Lone Parenthood 0.0232 (0.026)
University Degree Offspring 0.2816∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.2949∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.2866∗∗∗ (0.019)
Secondary School Father 0.0400∗∗ (0.018) 0.0539∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.0457∗∗∗ (0.016)
Secondary School Mother 0.0870∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.1042∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.0927∗∗∗ (0.022)
University Degree Father 0.0575 (0.049) 0.1257∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.0978∗∗ (0.040)
University Degree Mother 0.1231∗ (0.064) 0.1257∗∗ (0.062) 0.1218∗∗ (0.061)
Low-skilled Father -0.0119 (0.020)
High-skilled Father 0.0433 (0.032)
Low-skilled Mother -0.0305∗ (0.016)
High-skilled Mother -0.0385 (0.047)
IND2 0.0398 (0.037) 0.0441 (0.037)
IND3 0.0538 (0.036) 0.0581∗ (0.035)
IND4 0.1283∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.1336∗∗∗ (0.037)
IND5 0.0964∗ (0.055) 0.1349∗∗∗ (0.046)
Female × IND5 0.1025 (0.064)
Immigrant × IND5 -0.1398 (0.105)
Constant 1.8901∗∗∗ (0.160) 2.0923∗∗∗ (0.038) 1.9815∗∗∗ (0.052)
Observations 3224 3224 3224
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.244 0.250
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A.1: Quantile Regression Results for Deciles
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